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I. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A CENTURY OF
DISCONTINUOUS DEBATE
CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
A little more than one hundred years ago, in 1909 (the same year as the
founding conference for the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1),
the U.S. Supreme Court held its first and thus far only full-blown criminal
trial under its original jurisdiction. The defendants were a group of city
officials and townspeople from Chattanooga, Tennessee, and the charges
were criminal contempt. The charges arose from the lynching of Ed
Johnson—a black man accused of raping a white woman—an act of
defiance in response to the Supreme Court’s assertion of jurisdiction to
conduct federal habeas corpus review of his case. Johnson’s state court trial
began two weeks after the crime and concluded four days later; his lawyers
had been allotted only ten days to prepare his defense. Johnson was
convicted and sentenced to death by an all-white jury on extremely flimsy
evidence (the victim and sole witness to the crime testified, “I will not
swear that he is the man”) in a hasty proceeding suffused with the threat of
mob violence. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied Johnson’s appeal, but
Justice John Marshall Harlan (famous dissenter in Plessy v. Ferguson2
thirteen years earlier), after consulting with his brethren, accepted habeas
review of the case as the Circuit Justice hearing emergency appeals from
∗
Howard J. & Katherine W. Aibel Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and Judge
Robert M. Parker Endowed Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1
The Journal was a product of the “National Conference on Criminal Law and
Criminology,” held in 1909 to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Northwestern University
School of Law. Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, About the Journal: History of The
Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/about/ (last
visited Aug. 18, 2010).
2
163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., disssenting).
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the Sixth Circuit. The day following Justice Harlan’s order, a mob removed
Johnson from his cell with the tacit permission of jail officials and the
county sheriff. The mob brought Johnson to the county bridge that spanned
the Tennessee River, where they hanged him and also shot him more than
fifty times. One of those involved was a deputy sheriff who fired five shots
himself at point-blank range and left a note pinned to Johnson’s body that
read: “To Justice Harlan. Come get your n——r now.” The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, rejected vociferous
defense arguments that the Court’s assertion of jurisdiction over the case
constituted an unlawful intervention in state processes and held instead that
the violation of the Court’s order, if willful, would constitute criminal
contempt. 3 Ultimately, the sheriff, a deputy sheriff, and four leaders of the
lynch mob were convicted of contempt at trial and given sentences ranging
from sixty to ninety days in prison, though the sheriff was greeted as a hero
in Chattanooga upon his early release by a crowd of 10,000 supporters. 4
No one doubts that death penalty litigation has changed a great deal in
the past on hundred years, as this dramatic case illustrates. The authority of
the United States Supreme Court and the federal courts more generally to
review state capital and criminal convictions is now unquestioned, thanks in
no small part to the Chattanooga contempt prosecutions. Moreover, starting
in the decades following Johnson’s lynching and accelerating during the
constitutional criminal procedure revolution of the 1960s, the Supreme
Court established a plethora of constitutional guarantees regarding state
capital and criminal processes—including the rights to appointed counsel,
representative juries, and insulation from the threat of mob violence, among
many others. Ironically, Ed Johnson’s lawyers raised all three of these
claims in their representation of him, but to no avail. Indeed, it is clear that
the recognition of these federal rights was driven in large part by trials like
Johnson’s—hasty, mob-driven capital trials of black defendants in state
courts in the South that could be so perfunctory as to earn the sobriquet
“legal lynchings.” 5 The procedural world of Ed Johnson’s trial is
unrecognizable today and elicits amazed headshakes when presented to

3

United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573-74 (1906).
All of the facts regarding Johnson’s trial and lynching and the contempt proceedings
that followed are taken from Mark Curriden, A Supreme Case of Contempt, A.B.A. J., June
2009, at 34, available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_supreme_
case_of_contempt/.
5
See generally Michael J. Klarman, Powell v. Alabama: The Supreme Court Confronts
“Legal Lynchings,” in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 1, 42-43 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006)
(describing the phenomenon of the Supreme Court responding to “legal lynchings” with new
constitutional protections in the context of the famous “Scottsboro Boys” case).
4
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current law students studying the history of criminal procedure and federal
habeas corpus.
In contrast to the transformation of the legal process for capital trials,
many assume that the nature of public discourse about capital punishment
has remained relatively static, with the same old, well-worn arguments
about the morality or wisdom of the death penalty recycled through the
generations. There is a non-fanciful basis for this assumption, as some of
the most familiar arguments in debates about the death penalty make a
fairly unchanged appearance across the centuries. The leading scholarly
work on the history of the American death penalty describes a college
student at Columbia who, having left an essay until the last minute, sighs
that time pressure forced him “to take refuge in some old thread bare
subject as Capital punishment”—in 1793! 6 What was already “threadbare”
at the time of our nation’s founding has seen more than 200 years of further
wear and tear. Any student of death penalty debates over the generations
recognizes the timeless quality of certain approaches. For example, Cesare
Beccaria’s seminal 1764 essay Of Crimes and Punishments, 7 the first
sustained attack on the death penalty in the modern West, argued that longterm incarceration is a better deterrent than death and that executions set a
bad example for the populace, decrying the absurdity of the state killing in
an attempt to demonstrate that killing is wrong. These arguments could be
lifted and dropped into a contemporary state legislative session or high
school debater’s file without any change at all.
Our purpose in this essay is to challenge the easy (because partially
true) assumption that there is nothing new under the sun in death penalty
discourse. Rather, we contend that debates about capital punishment have
been as much discontinuous as continuous over the past century. Some
arguments that were made in the past have been entirely discredited or even
forgotten today, while our current debates contain arguments that would be
utterly foreign to denizens of earlier decades, despite the fact that they cared
deeply about the issue of capital punishment in their own times. We
address two “lost” arguments from the past in favor of the retention of
capital punishment: the contention that capital punishment was a necessary
antidote to extrajudicial lynchings and the defense of capital punishment as
part of a larger program of eugenics endorsed by many progressive leaders
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We also explore two
“new” abolitionist arguments from the present: the fiscal argument about

6

See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 88 (2002).
See generally CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1764), available at
http://www.constitution.org/cb/crim_pun.htm.
7
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the greater cost of capital punishment even in comparison to life
imprisonment and the concerns raised about the suffering of those awaiting
execution for lengthy periods (so-called Death Row Phenomenon). We
hope to show not only that death penalty discourse has not been as static as
is often assumed, but also that the debates of each era provide a window
onto both the nature of the actual practice of the death penalty in different
times and the broader social contexts in which that practice has operated.
II. TWO FORGOTTEN ARGUMENTS FOR THE RETENTION OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Consider the following thought experiment. Imagine asking the
members of any current audience in the United States to give the two
strongest arguments they can think of in favor of the retention of capital
punishment. The audience members would doubtless disagree and produce
a varied list of considerations, but it is highly unlikely that such a list would
contain arguments about either the prevention of lynchings or the
promotion of a program of eugenics. Yet these two considerations were
powerfully present in the lively debates about capital punishment that took
place a century ago. Not everyone who supported capital punishment in the
early twentieth century found either or both of these arguments persuasive,
and not everyone concerned about lynchings or enthusiastic about the
eugenics movement supported capital punishment. Yet everyone familiar
with public discourse about the death penalty at the time would have
recognized the relevance of these considerations to the debate and, indeed,
their sometimes decisive impact on policy. In what follows, we hope to recapture a flavor of the significance of these issues to early twentieth-century
debates about the death penalty and explore what light this significance
sheds on the changing role of capital punishment as a social practice over
the past century.
A. THE DEATH PENALTY AS A NECESSARY ANTIDOTE TO LYNCHING

Our country’s shameful history of lynchings—extrajudicial executions
mostly of black men suspected of criminal acts against whites—has been
well-documented. During the Reconstruction Era in the South, freed blacks
were frequently the target of lethal violence even in the absence of any
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, merely as part of “the wave of
counterrevolutionary terror that swept over large parts of the South” after
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the Civil War. 8 But the practice of lynching continued robustly well past
Reconstruction and into the twentieth century, primarily in the South,
claiming the lives of 4,708 people between the years of 1882 (when the
Tuskegee Institute first began keeping such records) and 1944 (after which
lynchings declined steeply). 9 The vast majority of these victims were black
men, and while statistically, the most commonly cited motivation for
lynching was the suspected murder of a white person by a black man, the
“most emotionally potent excuse” was the claim that a black man had raped
a white woman. 10 Historians of lynching in the South find it difficult to
overstate the centrality of the fear of black rapists to the practice of
lynching: “Black men were lynched for other crimes, but rape was always
the key.” 11 Even high-level elected officials in the South publicly endorsed
lynching as the only “suitable punishment” for black men who raped white
women. 12 Lynching was so entrenched a practice that in the most intense
period of lynchings in American history, 1889-1893, 13 considerably more
people were lynched than executed nationwide—921 to 556, by one
count. 14
8

ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, 425
(1988); see generally GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT THERE WAS NO PEACE: THE ROLE OF
VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION (1984).
9
See PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK
AMERICA viii (2002).
10
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 45 (1997).
11
EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19THCENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 240 (1984).
12
KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 45-46 (quoting U.S. Senator Theodore Bilbo of
Mississippi, among others).
13
AYERS, supra note 11, at 238.
14
James W. Garner, Crime and Judicial Inefficiency, 29 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 601 (1907),
reprinted in DEBATERS’ HANDBOOK SERIES: SELECTED ARTICLES ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
10, 11 (C. E. Fanning, ed., 1909) (reproducing the table compiled by the Chicago Tribune
and published in 1906). Ayers places the number of lynchings during this period at “nearly
700” but does not offer a specific source reference and does not indicate whether this figure
includes both black and white victims. See AYERS, supra note 11, at 238. A source
comprehensively comparing the number of lynchings and legal executions over time finds
that lynchings outnumbered legal executions in the South and Border states (where the vast
majority of lynchings occurred) between the years 1886 and 1895, with the balance shifting
toward legal executions over the next three decades. During this entire period (1886-1925),
lynchings never fell below half the number of executions, and the total numbers of lynchings
and executions in the two regions over this thirty-year period came out almost exactly equal.
See HOWARD W. ALLEN & JEROME M. CLUBB, RACE, CLASS, AND THE DEATH PENALTY:
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 84 tbl. 4.3 (2008). Moreover, the ratio of
lynchings to executions is higher and more sustained over time for blacks. See id. The exact
number of lynchings (and, in this period, of executions as well) is probably impossible to
determine, but precision is not crucial to the argument; any of the figures listed above
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The practice of lynching had some obvious implications for the
practice of capital punishment at the turn of the century. Many victims of
lynching were first identified as criminal suspects by their arrest on capital
charges. Lynchings frequently commenced with mobs dragging capital
suspects from their jail cells, often with the tacit or active participation of
local officials, before any trial could take place or lawful sentence be
imposed. 15 Even when the criminal process was allowed to run its course,
the threat of mob violence pervaded many trials, particularly trials of black
men charged with capital crimes against white victims. Jurors in such cases
must have felt intense pressure to yield to the passion of the mob, if, indeed,
they did not share that passion themselves. During Ed Johnson’s trial in
1906, when the white victim identified Johnson as her rapist, one of the
jurors had to be restrained by his fellows as he leapt from his chair yelling,
“If I could get at him, I would tear his heart out right now!” 16 The threat of
lynching affected post-trial proceedings as well; Johnson was by no means
the only capital defendant advised to relinquish his appellate rights in an
attempt to stave off a lynch mob (an attempt that proved vain in Johnson’s
case). 17 The ever-present threat of lynching led reformers to urge speeding
up the criminal process to allow for immediate trials followed by instant
executions, 18 pressures that created the practice known derogatorily as
“legal lynching,” a process that was often only a hairsbreadth away from
the illegal version. 19 The prevalence of lynching in the Deep South at the
turn of the century is probably best illustrated by the ingenious argument of
a defense lawyer to the jury in a case of alleged interracial attempted rape in
Louisiana in 1907 to the effect that his client must be innocent because
otherwise he surely would already have been lynched! 20
supports the claim that lynchings clearly outnumbered executions for a period shortly before
the turn of the twentieth century and remained numerically substantial in relation to
executions for decades after the turn of the century, at least in the regions in which lynching
was widely practiced.
15
See AYERS, supra note 11, at 245-46 (describing collusion of local officials);
KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 42-44 (quoting from NAACP, THIRTY YEARS OF LYNCHING IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1889-1918, 11-18 (1919)).
16
See Curriden, supra note 4, at 34.
17
See id.; see also Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Capital Punishment as Legal
Lynching?, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATES: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY
IN AMERICA 21, 35 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006) (describing a 1929
execution in Texas in which the defendant’s lawyers waived appeal to avoid a lynching as
representative of summary capital processes or “legal lynchings”).
18
AYERS, supra note 11, at 246.
19
See Klarman, supra note 5, at 2-3.
20
See Jennifer Wriggins, Comment, Race, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J.
103, 109 (1983) (quoting State v. Petit, 119 La. 1013, 1016 (1907) (“Now, don’t you know
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The practice of lynching, however, affected not only the administration
of capital punishment as described above, but also public discourse about
capital punishment as appropriate public policy. Supporters of capital
punishment urged that the maintenance of the death penalty was a necessary
antidote to lynching; indeed, it may well be that some who might otherwise
have opposed the death penalty came reluctantly to support it as a lesser
evil, given that the anti-lynching voices tended to come from the more
politically progressive members of communities in which lynching was
most prevalent. The role of lynching in public discourse about capital
punishment in the early twentieth century is most visible in the debates
surrounding the wave of abolitionist legislation during the Progressive Era
and the almost as powerful wave of reinstatement that shortly followed.
The experiences of Colorado and Tennessee, which both abolished and
quickly reinstated the death penalty during this period, are particularly
instructive about the powerful role that lynching could play in the fate of
the death penalty as law. But arguments about lynching and capital
punishment extended beyond specific legislative initiatives and were clearly
present more generally as stock positions in academic and popular
treatments of “the death penalty debate” during the first few decades of the
twentieth century.
First, consider the role of lynching in the waves of abolition and
reinstatement during the Progressive Era. The early decades of the
twentieth century were the most active period of death penalty repeal and
reinstatement in American history. Ten states abolished capital punishment
between 1897 and 1917, and eight of them reinstated the death penalty by
the end of the 1930s, some within only a few years of the original
abolition. 21 To be sure, each of these ten states has its own death penalty
story, and different considerations weighed more or less heavily in different
places at different times. Moreover, with the exception of Tennessee, all of
these states were in the West or Midwest rather than the heartland of
lynchings in the American South. Nonetheless, lynchings were “the most
important common triggering event in reinstatement of the death penalty”
after abolition, occurring in each of the four states with the shortest periods
of death penalty abolition. 22 The experiences of Tennessee (the only
Southern state to abolish the death penalty during this era) and Colorado
that, if this n——r had committed such a crime, he never would have been brought here and
tried . . . he would have been lynched . . . .”)).
21
John F. Galliher, Gregory Ray & Brent Cook, Abolition and Reinstatement of Capital
Punishment During the Progressive Era and Early 20th Century, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 538, 543-573 (1992) (providing state-by-state accounts).
22
Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
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(which was the first to abolish the death penalty during this era, but
reinstated before any other states joined it) are particularly helpful in
understanding the power of lynching in the politics of capital punishment in
the early twentieth century.
In Tennessee, abolition was accomplished in 1915 largely as a result of
the determined efforts of Duke Bowers, a retired Memphis merchant who
was so involved and influential that the legislation abolishing the death
penalty was titled the “Duke Bowers’ Bill.” 23 Bowers submitted a lengthy
brief to the legislature in support of the bill, in which he made a plethora of
arguments against the death penalty, emphasizing in particular the risk of
executing the innocent.24 But he also responded directly to the argument
that abolition would lead to more lynchings: “It is claimed by advocates of
the death penalty that if it is abrogated, it would increase lynching.
Here . . . statistics come to our aid [because other states did not experience a
rise in lynchings after abolition].”25 Bowers also maintained that lynch
mobs are encouraged more by state executions than by abolition: “If the
State does not consider life sacred, the mob, with ready rope, will strangle
the suspected. . . . In other words, why may not the mob do quickly what
the law does slowly?” 26 The Governor of Tennessee received many letters
urging the Governor’s veto of the bill predicting (or even threatening) mob
violence in its wake. A county attorney argued that the bill would “only
encourage mob law,” while a Tennessee state committee member predicted
that “if this bill should become law it would be almost impossible to
suppress mobs in their efforts to punish colored criminals.”27 Governor
Thomas Rye sent a veto statement to the legislature explaining his refusal to
sign the bill into law on the grounds that it would “increase crime and
encourage mob law.” 28 But the Governor’s veto was not sent within the
five-day time period set by state law, and thus abolition was passed in
Tennessee.

23

Id. at 556-57.
See Duke C. Bowers et. al., Life Imprisonment vs. The Death Penalty, Brief to the
Honorable Members of the Senate and Lower House of the Fifty-Eighth General Assembly
and to the Chairman and Members of the Judiciary Committees Thereof (1915), available at
http://www.archive.org/details/lifeimprisonment00bowe.pdf.
25
Id. at 18.
26
Id.
27
Galliher et al., supra note 21, at 557 (quoting letters received by Tennessee Governor
Thomas Rye).
28
Margaret Vandiver & Michel Coconis, “Sentenced to the Punishment of Death:” PreFurman Capital Crimes and Executions in Shelby County, Tennessee, 31 U. MEM. L. REV.
861, 881 (2001) (quoting Governor’s veto message to the state assembly).
24
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What is perhaps most striking about Tennessee’s abolition of capital
punishment (aside from its brevity, about which more below) is that, despite
the common listing of Tennessee among the ten Progressive Era abolitionist
states, Tennessee’s bill did not, in fact, “abolish” the death penalty. Rather,
Tennessee’s hard-fought measure abolished the death penalty only for most
forms of murder; it retained it for both for murder committed by a prisoner
serving a life sentence (rare) and also for the crime of rape (not so rare),
which was in practice punished by death only when the perpetrator was
black. 29 Tennessee’s retention for rape was unique among the rest of the
Progressive Era abolition bills, and it reflected the distinctively Southern
belief that lynch mob violence simply could not be suppressed in cases of
black men accused of the rape of white women, especially if the law refused
to treat such outrages as capital crimes.30
Tennessee’s abolition was short-lived; the death penalty was reinstated
a mere four years later in 1919. The emphasis on lynching in the drive for
reinstatement was, if anything, even stronger than it had been during the
abolition battle. Three lynchings (all of black men) occurred during the
four-year period of abolition, and all three lynchings were prolonged,
public, and gruesome affairs involving torture and burning. 31 These events
provoked community outrage, reflected in a series of editorials in the
Nashville Tennessean, and led to the formation of a citizen-sponsored “Law
and Order League” to combat lynching. 32 Because Tennessee’s period of
abolition overlapped with the United States’ involvement in World War I,
anti-lynching advocates also highlighted the effects of such violence on the
war effort:
“[t]he lynching . . . yesterday, can but sow disunion among our people, undermine the
morale of our negro troops, and lessen the effectiveness of our propaganda among the
colored people for food production and conservation. It will, therefore, tend to
33
prolong the war and increase the price of victory.”

One week after Governor Albert H. Roberts took office in 1919, he
sent an urgent message to the legislature, calling upon them to repeal
29

BANNER, supra note 6, at 222.
See George W. Hays (former Governor of Arkansas), The Necessity for Capital
Punishment, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 156, 162 (Julia E. Johnsen ed., 1939) (“[I]t is plainly
evident that if capital punishment were abolished and the bloodcurdling assaults [earlier
described by the author as “fiendish crimes of low-grade types of Negroes”] were
unpunishable by death, mob violence would be supreme.”); see also Vandiver & Coconis,
supra note 28, at 880.
31
See Galliher et al., supra note 21, at 564-65.
32
Id. at 565.
33
Id. (quoting Lynching Evil to be Fought, NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN, Apr. 25, 1918, at
8).
30
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abolition, charging that “the ‘Bowers Law’[] has been the contributing
cause to the commission of the crime of murder and to the summary
vengeance of the mob on the murderer,” 34 essentially echoing the concerns
of Governor Rye’s toothless veto message four years previously. The
legislature lost no time in acting; both houses voted by large majorities to
repeal abolition within twenty-four hours. 35
Colorado’s abolition bill, in contrast to that of Tennessee, enjoyed the
support of the Governor and was passed by the state senate without
discussion and by a large majority in 1897.36 But Colorado’s law lasted no
longer than Tennessee’s (four years) and was reinstated under similar
pressures—“in the face of what at the time seemed the threat of mob
rule.” 37 In the year preceding reinstatement in Colorado, two gruesome
lynchings (both of men, one “mulatto” and one black) were carried out
before large crowds. The Rocky Mountain Daily News editorialized
strenuously in favor of reinstatement in order “to prevent the recurrence of
such horrors.” 38 In addition to their intrinsic horribleness, lynching
represented the frightening threat of the deterioration of the rule of law and
democratic governance: “The greatest danger in a republic is a mob,” the
Bowers brief would later argue in Tennessee, quoting a “learned
statesman.” 39 Governing elites, especially in the South, feared the volatility
of the large class of poor whites, who could easily be moved to racially
motivated violence in times of economic uncertainty and escalating crime.
A white woman writing in 1914 on race relations in the South described this
class as “the nitrogen of the South”—a combustible element “ready at a
touch” to ignite “and in the ensuing explosion to rend the social fabric in
every direction.” 40 On a less apocalyptic but perhaps more accessible level,
lynchings also posed a threat to the state’s image: “In the case of such
crimes [that led to lynching] . . . a jury may be relied upon to fix the penalty
at death, and the certainty that it will do so will stop the blackening of

34
Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 28, at 882 (quoting Governor Roberts’s message to
the state assembly).
35
Id. at 882-83.
36
Galliher et al., supra note 21, at 553.
37
HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY 10 (rev. ed.
1967).
38
Galliher et al., supra note 21, at 561 (quoting Restore Capital Punishment, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN DAILY NEWS, May 24, 1900, at 4).
39
See Bowers, supra note 24, at 18.
40
AYERS, supra note 11, at 245 (quoting LILY H. HAMMOND, IN BLACK AND WHITE: AN
INTERPRETATION OF SOUTHERN LIFE 60-61 (1914)).
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Colorado’s fair name with lynchings.” 41 The apparently widespread belief
in Colorado that the lack of capital punishment made lynchings more likely,
if not inevitable, 42 undermined the earlier acceptance of abolition. The
legislature’s reinstatement was attributed by the press chiefly to the most
recent murder followed by lynching that had occurred only six months
previously. 43
Quite apart from the central role that lynching played in the abolition,
and especially the reinstatement, of capital punishment during the
Progressive era, the assertion that abolition would increase lynch mob
violence was a frequently made “stock” argument in the death penalty
debates of the early twentieth century, untethered to specific legislative
proposals. The Bowers brief to the Tennessee legislature is some evidence
of the general familiarity of the argument, with its reference to the lynching
argument made by unnamed “advocates of the death penalty.” 44 But the
best proof of the salience of the lynching argument is probably the
publication in several editions of the popular Debaters’ Handbook on
capital punishment of an essay entitled “Capital Punishment and
Lynching,” devoted entirely to the argument that “to abolish capital
punishment in this country is likely to provoke lynchings. Whenever
unusually brutal and atrocious crimes are committed, particularly if they
cross racial lines, nothing less than the death penalty will satisfy the general
sense of justice that is to be found in the average American community.” 45
This piece appeared in the first four of five editions of the Handbook,
published in 1909, 1913, 1917, and 1925, respectively. 46 It disappeared
from the fifth edition, published in 1939, although the argument “Lynchings
would increase” is included in that volume as part of an outline of
arguments for and against the death penalty under the general heading “It is
socially desirable that we retain the death penalty.”47

41
Galliher et al., supra note 21, at 561 (quoting Restore Capital Punishment, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN DAILY NEWS, May 24, 1900, at 4).
42
Id. at 562.
43
Id.
44
See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
45
J. E. Cutler, Capital Punishment and Lynching, 29 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 622, (1907),
reprinted in DEBATERS’ HANDBOOK SERIES: SELECTED ARTICLES ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
17, 21-22 (C.E. Fanning, ed., 1909).
46
See DEBATERS’ HANDBOOK SERIES: SELECTED ARTICLES ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
(C.E. Fanning, ed., 1909, 1913, and 1917); THE HANDBOOK SERIES: SELECTED ARTICLES ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Lamar T. Beman, ed., 1925) [hereinafter Beman].
47
Summary of Arguments, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 231, 243 (Julia E. Johnsen, ed.,
1939).
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Not surprisingly, the same Handbook series also contains attempted
refutations of this pro-death penalty lynching argument. One edition of the
Handbook contains an excerpt from the learned statesman quoted, but not
identified, in the Bowers brief who argues, “The greatest danger in a
republic is a mob, and as long as States inflict the penalty of death, mobs
will follow the example.” 48 Alternatively, some abolitionists in the
Handbook cleverly countered the claim that lynchings will result from the
perceived under-enforcement of the law resulting from abolition with the
plausible assertion that retention of capital punishment itself leads to underenforcement of the law, because juries sometimes wrongly acquit for fear of
inflicting death49 (and thus presumably will incite lynch mobs in this way,
as well). A more direct response to the lynching argument, similar once
again to one of the arguments in the Bowers brief, was made in a 1927 book
grandly titled Capital Punishment in the Twentieth Century, to the effect
that if lynchings were really substitutions for capital punishment, one would
expect to see more of them in abolitionist states.50 Nonetheless, as the book
points out, lynchings were demonstrably more common in states that
retained the death penalty than in those that abolished it. Of course, this
argument leads to the question of whether the states (particularly those of
the Deep South) that refused to abolish the death penalty would have
experienced no rise in lynchings had they abolished it. But the existence of
such a counter-argument in an abolitionist-tilted survey of capital
punishment demonstrates the felt need to address what a review (in this
illustrious Journal) of the 1927 book places first on a list of retentionist
arguments: the “danger of lynching.” 51
The prevalence and pride of place of the lynching argument in the
early years of the twentieth century, both in legislatures and in public
discourse more broadly, reflects a world in which capital punishment
played a very different role from its place in our current one. In this earlier
world (or at least in regions of it), extrajudicial lethal violence, targeted
especially at black men suspected of crimes against whites, was so common
that it could seem foolhardy, sentimental, or simply counterproductive to
attack the more vulnerable, but morally and socially more benign, legal
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Robert G. Ingersoll, 24 AM. L. REV. 203 (1890), reprinted in Beman, supra note 46, at

350.
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See Does Capital Punishment Prevent Convictions?, 40 REV. REV. 219, (1909),
reprinted in DEBATERS’ HANDBOOK SERIES: SELECTED ARTICLES ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
136 (C.E. Fanning, ed., 1909).
50
E. ROY CALVERT, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 85-86 (1927).
51
Clifford Kirkpatrick, Review of E. Roy Calvert, Capital Punishment in the Twentieth
Century (1927), 18 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609, 611 (1928).
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form of execution. In this world, state imposed death was not the worst, or
even the most likely, fate that could befall one suspected of a capital crime.
The defiance of the U.S. Supreme Court by Ed Johnson’s lynch mob is a
powerful symbol of the fragility of the legal order a century ago (at least in
certain places and with regard to interracial crimes) and the difficult
tradeoffs that many perceived in the relationship between lynchings and
legal executions.
B. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND EUGENICS

We, the authors, first encountered the proposal that eugenics might
undergird an argument in support of capital punishment as law clerks for
Justice Thurgood Marshall. Working on capital cases in Justice Marshall’s
chambers, we took pains to familiarize ourselves with the Court’s history of
constitutional regulation of capital punishment and especially with the
opinions of our boss, who joined the Court just before it began to
“constitutionalize” the death penalty in the late 1960s. We were both struck
by Justice Marshall’s opinion in the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia, 52
which temporarily struck down capital punishment as it was then
administered in the United States. In order to assess whether the death
penalty was an excessive or unnecessary punishment under the Eighth
Amendment, Justice Marshall identified “six purposes conceivably served
by capital punishment: retribution, deterrence, prevention of repetitive
criminal acts, encouragement of guilty pleas and confessions, eugenics, and
economy.” 53 The rest of list was familiar to us, even formulaic, but—
eugenics?? It seemed to us at the time, in our youth and inexperience, that
Justice Marshall was conjuring a straw man, positing an argument that no
one actually made and that could not really be taken seriously.
A visit to the early twentieth century, however, puts flesh and blood on
the supposed straw man of the argument from eugenics. The influence of
the eugenics movement on those concerned with the problems of crime and
punishment was enormous and, indeed, central to this Journal’s own
founding a century ago. John H. Wigmore, then the Dean of Northwestern
University School of Law, was a key member of the organizing committee
for the First National Conference on Criminal Law and Criminology in
1909, which led to the founding of the American Institute of Criminal Law
and Criminology and its official organ, this Journal. 54 Writing more than a
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408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Id. at 342.
54
See Jennifer Devroye, The Rise and Fall of the American Institute of Criminal Law
and Criminology, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 7, 7 (2010).
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decade later, Wigmore and other members of the Institute explained that
“the inspiration of Italy’s criminalists was strongly influential in the
founding of the ‘Journal of the Institute’ in 1909.” 55 By “Italy’s
criminalists,” Wigmore meant Cesare Lombroso and his student Enrico
Ferri, of the Italian Positivist School, who developed biological theories of
innate criminality. Lombroso sought to define the criminal type, Homo
delinquens, as a throwback to an earlier evolutionary era. 56 He believed
that one could see “the nature of the criminal” in the physical attributes of
criminals (large jaws, high cheek bones, handle-shaped ears, insensitivity to
pain, etc.)—“an atavistic being who reproduces in his person the ferocious
instincts of primitive humanity and the inferior animals.” 57 Ferri shared
Lombroso’s belief in the existence of congenital murderers with distinctive
physical characteristics and defended the idea of the “born criminal” in his
most important work, Criminal Sociology, published in 1917 in English
translation by the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology. 58
Lombroso and Ferri’s belief in the heritability of criminality was of
obvious relevance to those interested in the science of eugenics, defined by
its founder, the British naturalist Francis Galton, as “the study of agencies
under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future
generations, either physically or mentally.” 59 The eugenics movement of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was an attempt to harness
the science of eugenics “for the improvement of the human race by better
breeding,” according to Charles B. Davenport, a leader of the movement in
the United States in the early part of the twentieth century. 60 Many
reformers believed that eugenics offered some obvious prescriptions for
criminal justice policy, beyond studying the heredity and physical
characteristics of criminals. In addition to “positive” eugenics (promoting
the propagation of the fit), many criminal justice reformers urged policies of
“negative” eugenics (preventing the propagation of the unfit),61 often citing
55
Robert H. Gault, James W. Garner, Edwin R. Keedy & John H. Wigmore, The
Progress of Penal Law in the United States of America, 15 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 173, 174 (1924).
56
See ELOF AXEL CARLSON, THE UNFIT: A HISTORY OF A BAD IDEA 45 (2001).
57
Id. at 44 (quoting Leonard D. Savitz, Introduction to GINA LOMBROSO-FERRERO,
CRIMINAL MAN, ACCORDING TO THE CLASSIFICATION OF CESARE LOMBROSO xxv (1911)).
58
Devroye, supra note 54, at 13.
59
RUTH CLIFFORD ENGS, THE EUGENICS MOVEMENT: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA xii (2005)
(quoting Sir Francis Galton, Herbert Spencer Lecture Delivered before the University at
Oxford, June 5, 1907, in ESSAYS IN EUGENICS 81 (1909)).
60
Id. (quoting CHARLES DAVENPORT, HEREDITY IN RELATION TO EUGENICS 1 (1911)).
61
DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN
HEREDITY 47 (1985).
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the work of Lombroso. 62 In particular, sterilization and even castration
were frequently at the center of eugenics-inspired proposals to prevent
crime and punish criminals.63 Many states passed legislation in the first few
decades of the twentieth century compelling or permitting sterilization of
those who were epileptic, insane, or mentally retarded, or of those who
combined some mental defect with criminal behavior, or as punishment for
those who committed crimes such as rape or indecent exposure, or who
were recidivist offenders. 64
Despite the belief of many reformers in the early twentieth century that
the insights of eugenics into the causes of crime yielded obvious beneficial
prescriptions for crime policy, there was real division among eugenics
enthusiasts about its implications for capital punishment. Some of those
most enthusiastic about the sterilization or castration of prisoners were
opposed to capital punishment, believing that these alternative responses to
criminality would be either more effective deterrents or more humane, or
both. 65 Moreover, not every eugenics enthusiast was drawn to “negative”
policies like sterilization or immigration restriction. Rather, many social
radicals and utopians embraced eugenics; 66 among these were passionate
eugenics enthusiasts who supported more voluntary policies like the
legalization of birth control and euthanasia, disdained the crude theories of
racial or ethnic superiority that eventually tainted the eugenics movement,
and strenuously opposed capital punishment. 67 For this wing of the
eugenics movement, their opposition to capital punishment was not a
position they took despite their eugenic convictions, but rather because of
them. Eugenics helped to undermine the assumption of free will that
underlay the retributive justice of capital (and indeed of all) punishment. If
criminal behavior is to some degree determined by heritable biological traits
(and their interaction with the environment), then the moral case for capital
punishment based on just deserts is weakened by a corresponding degree (if
not entirely eliminated). As an abolitionist writing in 1927 explained, “The
trend of modern psychological thought . . . [is] that conduct is not

62
See CARLSON, supra note 56, at 399 (offering flowchart depicting Lombroso’s
influence in the rise of negative eugenics).
63
See id. at 199-229.
64
See id. at 248.
65
See id. at 202-03, 205 (describing views of Dr. Walter Lindley, Dr. W.A. Hammond,
and Dr. Robert Boal regarding castration and sterilization).
66
See KEVLES, supra note 61, at 85.
67
See ALEXANDRA MINNA STERN, EUGENIC NATION: FAULTS AND FRONTIERS OF BETTER
BREEDING IN MODERN AMERICA 118 (describing the beliefs of eugenics enthusiast and
innovative reformer August Vollmer).
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determined by an unknowable something called free will, but by personality
traits built up through the interaction of heredity and environment.” 68
So why did Justice Marshall identify eugenics as a pro-death penalty
argument? As one historian of the eugenics movement explains, “To the
followers of Lombroso, the criminal problem was solved through
emigration, perpetual imprisonment, and capital punishment to protect the
present and to prevent the genetic spread of crime.” 69 Even those who
opposed the death penalty in the early twentieth century found it easy to see
and articulate the eugenic argument for capital punishment. As a prominent
abolitionist explained in 1919, the death penalty “might be defended as an
agency of conscious artificial selection for the elimination of dangerous
biologic stocks from the community, in accordance with the ideas of the
Positivist school of criminologists.” 70 Another abolitionist elaborated,
“There is a eugenic objection sometimes raised to the substitution of life
imprisonment for Capital Punishment. A life imprisonment sentence in
present practice is subject to periodic review and generally means ultimate
release. . . . [Thus,] it may be extremely undesirable to allow certain
persons of tainted heredity to go free.” 71 These authors went on to rebut
such arguments as proving far too much 72 and leading to “unthinkable”
excesses, 73 but they phrase their objections as counters to what appears to
be a “stock” or familiar argument.
The salience of the eugenic argument in favor of capital punishment is
most clear in its frequent repetition in the essays and articles collected in the
Debaters’ Handbook series published five times over the course of the
thirty years between 1909 and 1939. In the first edition of the Handbook, a
supporter of capital punishment replied to a recent abolitionist essay with
the following observations drawn from the work of Lombroso:
The fact is that there is mentally a true criminal type . . . . Heredity and atavism
between them have produced the criminal recidivist, the throw-back in the evolution
of mankind.
Granting . . . that reformation is out of the question, are we not to continue and say
that the interests, and even the being of the criminal, are to be sacrificed for the
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CALVERT, supra note 50, at 150 (internal quotes omitted).
CARLSON, supra note 56, at 68 (emphasis added).
70
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CALVERT, supra note 50, at 193.
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welfare of the public? Surely if the first premise is correct, the second necessarily
follows. 74

In the same edition of the Handbook, an abolitionist listed eight arguments
in favor of capital punishment, the second of which was that “[i]t rids
society of criminal pests and dangerous savages.” 75 Although the author
ultimately advocated for reliance on “brick walls and strong cells” 76 instead
of the death penalty, the prominence of such a social hygiene argument on
this list is telling with regard to the salience of the eugenic argument the
debates of the time. Both of these essays were reprinted in the second and
third editions of the Handbook, and the Vicars essay was also reprinted in
the fourth edition. Although neither essay made it into the fifth edition of
the Handbook, that volume’s outline of arguments for and against the death
includes the argument that “[i]t is socially desirable that we retain the death
penalty,” because “[t]he elimination of the worst classes of murderers . . . is
biologically better.” 77
Despite the prominence of these eugenic arguments about capital
punishment in the debates of the early twentieth century, at least one
historian of the American death penalty, Stuart Banner, argues that “the
death penalty was never widely perceived to have a eugenic basis.” 78
Banner recognizes that during the heyday of the eugenics movement in the
early part of the twentieth century, “there were a few proponents of the
death penalty on the ground that it would prevent the worst criminals from
reproducing.” 79 However, Banner contends that this view was not
particularly influential because it was undermined both by the fact that
“capital punishment was a patently inefficient eugenic program” and by the
way in which “[b]iological theories of crime tended to undermine, not
support, capital punishment.” 80 Banner is surely right that the eugenic
argument for capital punishment lacks some logical force, but its ubiquity
and persistence over time (at least until World War II) suggest that its
persuasiveness lay in something other than its logic.
74

C.J. Ingram, Shall We Abolish the Death Penalty?, 170 WESTMINSTER REV. 91-98,
(1908), reprinted in DEBATERS’ HANDBOOK SERIES: SELECTED ARTICLES ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 156, 164 (C. E. Fanning ed., 1909) (emphasis added).
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G. Rayleigh Vicars, Ought Capital Punishment to be Abolished?, 143 WESTMINSTER
REV. 561 (1895), reprinted in DEBATERS’ HANDBOOK SERIES: SELECTED ARTICLES ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 137, 139 (C. E. Fanning ed., 1909).
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Id. at 143.
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Summary of Arguments, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 231, 243 (Julia E. Johnsen ed., 1939)
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What that something else might be is illuminated in the fifth edition of
the Handbook series published in 1939, when the eugenic argument in favor
of capital punishment became more overtly and intensely racist, at the same
time that eugenic ideas and policies were reaching full flower in Nazi
Germany. In one excerpt, a supporter of capital punishment urged the
maintenance of the death penalty as a form of societal self-defense against
dangerous inferior groups, like immigrants and blacks. On the topic of
immigration, the author (a member of the Michigan State Bar Association’s
Committee on Capital Punishment) explained, “With the good immigrant
has come the bad. The scum of Europe, like the plague of the locusts, has
descended upon us.” 81 On the topic of blacks, the author was even more
explicit:
It has been established beyond any doubt that our modern killer is biologically
inferior. Authorities agree upon this fact. To illustrate: Memphis, with its illiterate,
defective Negro population, has the highest murder rate of any American city. On the
other hand, St. Paul and Minneapolis, of almost pure Scandinavian stock, have the
82
lowest.

The author urged that the death penalty “will terminate the breeding of
diseased stock . . . and it will prevent the repetition by this offender, of
further monstrous acts.” 83 Along similar lines, the former Governor of
Arkansas argued that the death penalty was necessary to deal with one of
the South’s most serious problems—“the Negro question.” 84 The former
Governor explained that “the latter race is still quite primitive, and in
general culture and advancement in a childish stage of progress.” 85 He
warned, “If the death penalty were to be removed from our statute-books,
the tendency to commit deeds of violence would be heightened owing to
this Negro problem. The greater number of the race do not maintain the
same ideals as the whites.” 86 Governor Hays’s arguments echo the earlier
views of J.E. Cutler, published in the first several volumes of the Handbook
series, that the “the colored race in the United States is a child race,”87 one
that does not share “the same standards as the whites, either intellectually,
morally, or industrially.” 88 Both Hays and Cutler argued that the
81
John M. Dunham, Report of Committee on Capital Punishment, 1928, 8 MICH. ST.
BAR J. 279 (1929), reprinted in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 192, 195 (Julia E. Johnsen ed., 1939).
82
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83
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84
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predisposition of the black race to heinous crimes meant that capital
punishment was necessary both to deter such crimes and to prevent the
outraged lynchings that would inevitably follow in the absence of swift and
certain capital justice.
Thus, it is not surprising that Thurgood Marshall, alone among the
Justices who each wrote individually on the question of the constitutionality
of capital punishment in Furman, would remember the eugenic argument in
favor of capital punishment, with its eventually explicit racial cast. Justice
Marshall had worked on numerous criminal and capital cases early in his
career in the 1930s and 1940s, and arguments of the type made by Cutler
and Hays were not ancient history to him, but rather lived reality. The rise
of eugenics as a powerful new idea, while often embraced by progressive
reformers, also allowed old-fashioned racists—the ideological descendents
of those who had defended slavery on the grounds that some inferior races
were “natural slaves” 89—to add a new scientific gloss to an old prejudice.
When considered together, the early twentieth century arguments about
lynching and eugenics unearthed above reveal how much the debates about
capital punishment at that time were debates about race and how much the
death penalty itself, as it was practiced on the ground, was racially
inflected. Justice Marshall clearly did not need such a reminder, but
perhaps we, in our supposed “post-racial” society in which other issues
predominate in our own death penalty debates, are more prone to forget.
Thus, we would do well to heed the lessons that these two “lost” arguments
teach us about the strong connections, which would have been obvious to
contemporaneous observers a century ago, between the death penalty
question and what Governor Hays called “the Negro question.”
III. TWO NEW ARGUMENTS AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The most powerful “new” argument in the death penalty debate—one
that simply did not exist in any sustained form prior to the modern era of
capital punishment in the United States (post-1976)—emphasizes the
greater cost of capital punishment compared to the alternative of long-term

89
T.R.R. Cobb, author of an influential nineteenth-century study of the Southern law of
slavery, explained that his “‘inquiry into the physical, mental, and moral development of the
negro race, seems to point them clearly, as peculiarly fitted for a laborious class.’” See
Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global Economy,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1022 (2002) (quoting Thomas R.R. Cobb, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY 46-47 (1858)). The idea of “natural slaves” relied upon by some
nineteenth-century defenders of slavery in the United States can be traced back to Aristotle.
See generally Fred Miller, Aristotle’s Political Theory, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (2002), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/.
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(even lifetime) imprisonment. The argument has become so ubiquitous in
contemporary debates about the death penalty that it is hard to imagine that
it was virtually non-existent until a few decades ago. Indeed, in one
generation, the cost argument has become perhaps the greatest threat to the
continued robust use of capital punishment in the United States. This
section will examine how and why the cost argument emerged over the past
few decades as well as the reasons for its virtual absence in death penalty
discourse during the first centuries of capital practice in this country. The
section will also highlight the particular prominence of the cost argument in
the past few years and its critical role in efforts to limit and repeal the death
penalty. The cost argument is important not simply because it is new, but
because it significantly broadens the constituency concerned about the
death penalty. The utilitarian, community-oriented cast of the cost
argument has much more traction in popular and legislative debate than its
longstanding counterparts emphasizing equality and individual rights-based
objections to capital punishment.
A second important “new” argument in the death penalty debate
focuses on another aspect of contemporary capital practice distinctive to our
time: the prolonged interval between the pronouncement of sentence and
execution, often endured by the condemned in essentially solitary
confinement. Unlike concerns about cost, concerns about excessive death
row confinement have not emerged in public discourse or legislative debate
as the most pressing grounds for challenging the death penalty. But the
claim that prolonged death row confinement is unconstitutionally cruel
exposes some of the central failings of the prevailing capital system.
Although presently cast as a claim of individual deprivation, it also calls
into question whether the American death penalty as a system can continue
on its present course. Moreover, the central fact behind the claim—that
death sentences are often hollow pronouncements—has generated a new,
victim-oriented assault on the death penalty emphasizing the inability of our
capital system to provide meaningful redress for victims’ families.
A. THE ABSENCE AND EMERGENCE OF COST CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY DEBATE

At one level, the explanation for the absence of the cost argument prior
to the modern era is rather straightforward. Before the U.S. Supreme Court
embarked on its course of constitutional regulation of capital punishment in
the early 1970s, the costs associated with the death penalty were relatively
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minimal. 90 This was true both in comparison to the cost of available noncapital sanctions throughout our history and in comparison to the cost of the
death penalty in the present day. Prior to the Court’s intervention, capital
trials were not categorically different from cases involving non-capital
serious felonies, and the length and costs associated with such trials were
modest compared to contemporary practice. Post-conviction expenses in
capital cases were likewise relatively modest, both in terms of litigation
costs (state and federal habeas) and incarceration costs. For most of our
country’s history, the average time between pronouncement of sentence and
execution was measured in weeks and months (not years and decades), so
there was little reason to believe that the pronouncement of a sentence of
death imposed a significant ongoing financial burden for the state. Hence,
to the extent financial considerations bore on the death penalty debate prior
to the modern era, they tended to support rather than undermine the case for
capital punishment.
Yet interestingly, throughout our country’s history, the question of cost
and the death penalty was rarely broached—even during times of economic
crisis and even when the relative cost advantages or disadvantages of
executions seemed obvious. During the colonial era, for example, the death
penalty was likely more expensive than its alternatives. Incarceration was
not yet a viable penal option (jails were used primarily for debtors and pretrial incarceration), and the most common non-capital sanctions—fines,
corporal punishments (whippings, brandings), and shaming punishments
(the stock and the public cage)—involved fewer community resources than
those expended on public executions. 91 It was common to allow a period of
several weeks or even months to elapse between sentencing and execution
to facilitate the offender’s repentance and to make arrangements for the
edifying spectacle that the execution was expected to offer. 92 The costs
associated with even this short-term delay were not insignificant (the simple
housing and feeding of the condemned was a “significant expense,”93 as
well as the cost of pursuing and recapturing condemned inmates who

90
A more sustained discussion of the role of the cost argument in past and present
American death penalty discourse can be found in Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker,
Cost and Capital Punishment: A New Consideration Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 CHI.
L. F. 93.
91
David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 111, 112
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995).
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escaped from the often insecure jails 94), but these expenses were absorbed
without much reflection or reservation. The unquestioned willingness to
incur such costs reflected a consensus about the importance of the
criminal’s salvation (to be secured by the power of the impending execution
to focus an offender’s attention on his redemption) as well as the
assumption that public attendance at executions served valuable functions
in terms of general deterrence and community cohesiveness.
Toward the end of the colonial era, influential Founding era thinkers,
including Benjamin Franklin and James Madison, offered the first sustained
critique of the American death penalty, urging restriction and even abolition
in the new republic. These and other early American critics of the death
penalty borrowed heavily from the enormously influential work of Cesare
Beccaria, whose essay Of Crimes and Punishments, published in 1764,
called for the wholesale abolition of capital punishment.95 Becarria’s essay
included arguments from political theory (individuals lacked the right to
commit suicide and thus could not delegate that power to the state) as well
as instrumental claims (the threat of “perpetual slavery” was a sufficient
deterrent to crime and the purported benefits of public executions were
undermined by their “barbarity”). Becarria’s arguments framed the debate
about the death penalty on both sides of the Atlantic during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the question of “cost” in its
modern sense (e.g., the relative financial costs to the state of imposing death
versus some alternative punishment) was entirely absent from his lengthy
critique notwithstanding his strongly utilitarian approach to the issue. Some
other influential theorists, including Jeremy Bentham and Thomas
Jefferson, observed that the death penalty prevented offenders from
engaging in labor which could provide compensation to their victims or the
State, 96 but these observations were not tied to a more comprehensive
calculus of the financial costs of the death penalty versus its alternatives. In

94
See id. at 18 (“The expenses of twice recapturing John Brown [a condemned burglar
who twice escaped from the Litchfield jail], for example, formed a major part of the bill
submitted to the Connecticut Assembly by William Stanton, Litchfield’s jailer.”).
95
See BECCARIA, supra note 7.
96
See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, LAW, AND
POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 76-78 (1987) (discussing Bentham’s essay, The Rationale
of Punishment, published in 1775, in which Bentham argues that imprisonment was a
superior punishment to execution because the death penalty was “not convertible to profit”
and lacked “frugality” in that convicts could not provide “compensation” to victims or to the
state); BANNER, supra note 6, at 95 (discussing Jefferson’s argument in favor of abandoning
capital punishment for lesser felonies in the newly independent state of Virginia in 1778
because criminals who were not executed might “be rendered useful in various labors for the
public”).
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any event, it is clear that questions of financial cost took a back seat to the
more prevalent arguments about optimal deterrence and appropriate moral
education that lay at the heart of the new utilitarian critique of the death
penalty.
Nor did the question of financial cost emerge during the great prisonbuilding period of the early and mid-nineteenth century. Pennsylvania,
New York, and other states through the Northeast and Midwest inaugurated
a new era of criminal justice with the establishment of penitentiaries,
founded on the belief that wrongdoers could be reformed if removed from
pernicious societal influences and subjected to a regimen of strict discipline
in a “corruption-free environment.” 97 The construction of prisons required
enormous outlays of public funds and offered a previously unavailable
alternative to the death penalty: lengthy incarceration. Notwithstanding the
obvious financial impact of the penitentiary movement, and the possibility
that the death penalty might provide a less expensive alternative for serious
offenders, there is little indication that the debate over the death penalty
shifted toward considerations of cost in the wake of massive public
expenditures on the newly constructed, imposing prisons. The absence of
such argument is likely attributable to the confidence of reformers that the
new prisons would produce greater social benefits than costs.98 On the one
hand, the penitentiaries were expected to provide the conditions for genuine
repentance (and thus salvation), a benefit that the religiously motivated
reformers were unlikely to subject to a conventional “cost-benefit” analysis.
In addition, reformers believed that penitentiaries would significantly
reduce recidivism through reformation, a promise that, if realized, might
outweigh the costs of the prisons themselves. 99 Perhaps most importantly,
the penitentiary system was organized around the principle of compelled
labor, a highly valuable commodity in an era of increased
industrialization. 100 Prison labor greatly offset the cost of building and
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71 (1971).
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maintaining prisons and thus muted concerns about the potential costs to the
state of lengthy incarceration.
Hence, even during the Progressive Era, when many states revisited
the wisdom of capital punishment, references to the costs associated with
lengthy incarceration are difficult to find. Indeed, in the widely available
Debaters’ Handbook on capital punishment discussed above, few
references to cost appear in the dozens of collected excerpts from
newspapers, magazines, and scholarly journals, and when the subject arises,
it is treated rather perfunctorily. For example, one author lists as the sixth
of eight arguments in favor of the death penalty that “[i]t saves the
community all cost of keeping criminals for many years,” but the author
quickly acknowledges the “rude truth” that “men under a life sentence
could be placed in a position to earn the cost of their keep and a good
margin over in addition.” 101 Overall, from the Founding era well into the
early twentieth century, one gets the sense that both capital punishment and
imprisonment were relatively cheap compared to their costs today, so that
no one spent much time trying to figure out which was cheaper or arguing
for or against the death penalty on such grounds. Moreover, the strong
ideological and religious commitments which motivated the use of the
death penalty and imprisonment appear to have overwhelmed
considerations of cost in the modern sense.
By the mid-twentieth century, a consensus seemed to have emerged
that long-term incarceration was in fact more expensive than capital
punishment, despite any offset from prison labor. Capital trials, especially
in the South, involved minimal safeguards 102 and often were completed,
from jury selection to sentencing, in a matter of hours or (a few) days.
Moreover, the interval between sentence and execution remained quite
modest well into the twentieth century, as state and federal postconviction
remedies remained relatively unintrusive.
That capital punishment
produced economic advantages vis-à-vis long-term incarceration was “a
very pervasive belief” 103 in the second half of the twentieth century, so
much so that the public continued to assume that capital punishment was
the cheaper option even as the costs of administering the death penalty
began to rise in the later decades of the twentieth century. 104
101
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The 1960s produced a sustained reexamination of capital punishment
both in the public sphere and especially in the courts. Capital sentences and
executions declined substantially in the decades following World War II,
and several states legislatively limited or abolished the death penalty in the
early 1960s. The Civil Rights movement and the Vietnam War generated
considerable skepticism about the benign character of governmental power.
A Gallup Poll in 1966 found for the first and only time that more
Americans opposed capital punishment than supported it.105 Concerns
about discrimination and abuse in the criminal justice system—particularly
the perfunctory trials of the old South—prompted the Warren Court to
extend many of the criminal procedure protections in the Bill of Rights
against the states, including the exclusionary rule of the Fourth
Amendment, the rights to counsel and jury trial in the Sixth Amendment,
and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth
Amendment. When several members of the Court signaled in 1963 that the
death penalty might be disproportionate when used to punish the crime of
rape, 106 the nation’s leading civil rights organization, the Legal Defense
Fund of the NAACP (LDF), embarked on an ambitious “moratorium”
strategy to bring executions in the country to a halt.107
In defending death-sentenced inmates, LDF lawyers made use of the
many newly recognized procedural protections available in state criminal
proceedings. They also developed a distinctive set of arguments focused on
the failings of the American death penalty itself. These core arguments
emphasized the discriminatory and arbitrary administration of the death
penalty, the lack of continuing public support for the punishment, the
anachronistic character of “retributive” defenses of the death penalty, and
the inability of the death penalty to serve any important social values
(including deterrence), especially in light of its rare imposition.
The LDF strategy succeeded in bringing executions to a halt, and the
Supreme Court agreed to decide whether the American death penalty
comported with “evolving standards of decency” under the Eighth
Amendment. The resulting decision in Furman v. Georgia 108 invalidated
105
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prevailing capital statutes largely because of their failure to provide
adequate guidance to sentencers in choosing between life and death. The
case generated the most sustained judicial consideration of the American
death penalty in U.S. history, with almost 250 pages in the U.S. Reports
offering arguments supporting and opposing its continued use. 109 Notably
absent from the extensive discussions is any sustained focus on the question
of cost. Indeed, the sole mention of cost was offered by Justice Marshall to
rebut the claim that the death penalty is a cheaper alternative than
imprisonment: “As for the argument that it is cheaper to execute a capital
offender than to imprison him for life, even assuming that such an
argument, if true, would support a capital sanction, it is simply
incorrect.” 110 The absence of the cost argument in the various opinions
stems in part from the fact that the cost argument is not a constitutional
argument against the death penalty (though it might be part of a
constitutional defense of the punishment, in response to the claim that the
death penalty serves no valid state goals). But the absence of the cost
argument is likely also attributable to the widespread belief (and perhaps
reality) that the death penalty was comparatively cheaper than long-term
imprisonment. At the time of Furman and well into the 1980s, supporters
of the death penalty were much more likely than opponents to list the cost
of the death penalty as a reason supporting their position. 111
Furman itself, though, would radically reshape the economics of
capital punishment. By embarking on a course of constitutional regulation
of the death penalty—the defining feature of the “modern era” of the
American death penalty—the Court would significantly increase the costs
of capital litigation. Neither the increase in costs nor the shift in public
opinion would occur overnight. It would take more than a quarter century
before the conventional wisdom regarding the comparatively higher cost of
imprisonment would give way to a new, widespread belief that the death
penalty is substantially more expensive than the alternative of
imprisonment—even life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
In the wake of Furman, numerous states sought to cure the
constitutional defect of standardless discretion by redrafting their capital
statutes. Some states made the death penalty mandatory for certain
offenses, while others sought to structure the death penalty decision through
the use of aggravating and mitigating factors. When the Supreme Court
109
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revisited capital punishment in 1976, reviewing five of the new capital
schemes, it upheld the guided discretion statutes and invalidated the
mandatory ones. 112 It rejected the mandatory statutes because of the
“qualitative difference” between capital and non-capital punishment,
inaugurating a new constitutional commitment to the death-is-different
principle. 113
The defining feature of the guided discretion schemes was the
establishment of a distinct punishment phase in capital proceedings during
which the jury (or judge) would be focused solely on the question of
punishment. The guided discretion statutes no longer permitted the death
penalty to be imposed for the crime of murder or rape without a separate
finding of at least one “aggravating” factor. Moreover, the bifurcated
structure of capital proceedings suggested that defense attorneys should
devote substantial energy and resources not only to the question of guilt or
innocence, but also to developing and presenting “mitigating” evidence that
might justify a sentence less than death.
As a result of the recasting of state capital statutes, as well as the
Court’s embrace of the “death-is-different” principle, the costs associated
with capital trials would grow exponentially in the following decades. The
new model of bifurcated proceedings with a focused punishment phase
would gradually become the national norm, and the Court’s emerging
capital doctrines would substantially alter many state capital trial practices,
including voir dire, the use of experts, the expectations of defense counsel,
and, especially, the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence.
In addition, post-trial litigation costs would become vastly greater in capital
cases. At the state level, most states gradually developed schemes requiring
the appointment of counsel for death-sentenced inmates in state
postconviction proceedings even though non-capital inmates had no such
right to post-trial representation. Congress likewise made provision for
appointment of counsel in capital federal habeas proceedings (with noncapital inmates enjoying no comparable entitlement). 114
The Supreme Court’s development of intricate doctrines governing
capital proceedings greatly extended the average time between sentence and
execution. During the first two decades of constitutional regulation, capital
sentences were subject to a remarkable reversal rate, with about 68% of
112
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capital verdicts invalidated on direct appeal or in postconviction. 115 As a
result, the number of inmates on death rows throughout the country
increased dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s, reaching a modern era
nationwide high of over 3,500 inmates by 2000—over five times the size of
the national death row that accumulated during the five-year moratorium on
executions preceding Furman. 116
The bulk of the new expenses in capital litigation are incurred at trial.
But the cost of managing large death rows has also become quite
substantial. In California, for example, a recent report indicated that deathrow incarceration costs the state an additional $90,000 per inmate, per year
(above the cost of non-capital incarceration), or $60 million a year
overall. 117 Moreover, in a number of states (including California), the
prospects for converting death sentences into executions remain quite
remote. The multiple opportunities for review at different stages and in
different courts allow for executions to be avoided almost altogether in
jurisdictions where there is not a sustained political will for them to go
forward. Given the intricate doctrines surrounding the implementation of
the death penalty, executions require a “perfect storm” of cooperation
involving numerous actors, including local prosecutors and judges, statewide prosecutors and judges, state executive officials, and federal judges.
As a result, only a handful of the thirty-five states that currently authorize
the death penalty have carried out significant numbers of executions over
the past thirty-five years (with only five carrying out more than fifty, and
with three—Texas, Virginia, and Oklahoma—accounting for more than half
(661) of the executions nationwide (1,261)).118
The combination of increased trial costs, increased postconviction
litigation costs, and increased incarceration costs in capital cases, together
with the absence of significant numbers of executions in many states, has
changed the way in which the “costs” of the death penalty are understood
and discussed. The relative cost of the death penalty is no longer captured
by a simple comparison of the cost of a capital trial together with the cost of
115
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carrying out an execution, on the one hand, versus the cost of a non-capital
trial and the cost of lengthy imprisonment, on the other. Rather, the relative
cost of administering the death penalty post-Furman now often requires a
comparison of the cost of multiple capital trials and the cost of lengthy,
often indefinite imprisonment on death row versus the cost of a single, noncapital trial and the cost of lengthy (non-capital) imprisonment.
Indeed, the modern era has inaugurated a new measure of the cost of
the death penalty: the cost per execution in a particular state. This
accounting method divides the total expenditures on capital cases within a
jurisdiction (trial costs, postconviction litigation costs, death-row
incarceration costs) by the number of death sentences the jurisdiction
actually consummates with an execution. In jurisdictions with few
executions, the figures are staggering. Using this approach, a recent
editorial in the New York Times suggested that California’s thirteen
executions over the past thirty-five years cost about a quarter of a billion
dollars each. 119 In Maryland, which came close to abolishing the death
penalty in its recent legislative session, a 2008 study indicated that the state
spent at least an additional $37.2 million for each of the state’s five
executions in the modern era. 120
Concerns about the cost of capital punishment were first voiced with
some frequency beginning in the 1990s, as changes in capital practice and
the growth of death rows began to transform the economics of capital
punishment.
Such concerns undoubtedly have contributed to the
extraordinary decline in capital sentencing over the past fifteen years. In
the mid-1990s, the yearly number of death sentences obtained nationwide
averaged about 326. 121 Since that time, capital sentences have declined
over 60%, with annual death sentences over the past three years hovering
around 112. 122 This remarkable decline in death sentences is not
attributable to the relatively modest decline in murders during this period
(in fact, the murder rate has remained virtually constant from 2000-2007, at
the same time that death sentences dropped about 50%). 123 Although there
119
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is no comprehensive data definitively establishing the causes of the decline,
the available evidence points to the decreased willingness of district
attorneys to seek the death penalty, in large part because of cost concerns.
Prosecutors declining to seek death have repeatedly defended their
decisions on cost-cutting grounds, 124 and numerous editorials and news
reports have brought public attention and scrutiny to expensive cases in
which prosecutors chose to seek death. 125
The most tangible evidence of the emergence of the cost argument has
surfaced in contemporary legislative debates about whether to retain the
death penalty. The cost argument may well have been decisive in the
legislative repeals of the death penalty in New Jersey (2007) and New
Mexico (2009), as well as the decision not to reinstate the death penalty in
New York after its statute was found defective in 2004. In New Jersey,
public opinion leaned toward retention at the time the legislature acted. 126
The state commission charged with studying capital punishment concluded
that the death penalty was no longer consistent with evolving standards of
decency. 127 But, as newspaper coverage of the legislative decision reflects,
“equally persuasive to lawmakers was not saving lives but saving
money,” 128 given the increased costs of death-row incarceration. A policy
report indicated that New Jersey had spent over a quarter of a billion dollars
on the death penalty in the two or so decades prior to repeal (over and
above what the state would have spent on life without the possibility of
parole) 129 even though the death-row population numbered only ten and no
executions had been carried out by the time repeal was achieved. In low
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death-sentencing, low executing states like New Jersey, the cost of the
death penalty is measured by the cost of maintaining a capital system and
not simply the cost of particular cases. Along these lines, New Hampshire
is presently considering whether to repeal its capital statute, and one of the
six questions to be addressed by a specially formed commission is whether
“there is a significant difference in the cost of prosecution and incarceration
between capital punishment and life without possibility of parole for the
convicted capital murderer.” 130 Like New Jersey, New Hampshire has a
relatively dormant capital system, with only one inmate on death row and
no executions since 1939; one of the immediate financial considerations,
though, is whether to construct and staff a lethal injection death chamber, as
a recent state department of corrections master plan indicated that such an
effort would cost the state over $3 million.131 In New York, after the state’s
capital statute (enacted in 1995) was invalidated by the state courts in 2004,
the state assembly conducted extensive public hearings to inform its
decision whether to fix the eminently correctable defect in the statute.
Among the prominent considerations in its decision not to act was the high
cost of administering a capital system. The assembly’s report on the public
hearings cited testimony from a district attorney that the state spent as much
as $200 million on capital prosecutions in the decade or so that the statute
had been in effect and that the reinstatement of the death penalty might cost
the state an additional $500 million over twenty years, while likely yielding
only two or three executions during that period. 132
In New Mexico, the only state to repeal its capital statute since the
economic downturn of late 2008, the cost issue may have tipped the
balance. As one commentator observed:
[T]he New Mexico abolition campaign made use of an argument never used in death
penalty debate in the 1960s and 1970s but which probably helped turn the tide in
2009—the cost of administering the death penalty, from trial to appeal to post
conviction relief to federal habeas corpus to isolation of men on death row to costs of
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execution was simply an expenditure of too much public money when the state was
133
starving for dollars for good programs.

The cost argument has also been prominent in several other states in
which repeal has been considered but not accomplished. In Colorado, for
example, the effort to repeal the death penalty was explicitly tied to freeing
up funds to solve “cold cases.” 134 Despite its small death row (three),
Colorado apparently spends approximately four million dollars a year on
capital costs. 135 The proposed legislation mandated that the money saved
by abolishing the death penalty would be dedicated to funding eight state
investigators who would reopen more than 1,400 cold case homicides. 136
Although the measure was barely defeated, the striking aspect of the
Colorado experience was the abolitionist strategy to drive home the
opportunity costs of retention by highlighting in concrete terms the
alternative goods that death penalty dollars could purchase.
References to the issue of cost have exploded over the past two years
in response to the global fiscal crisis. Cash-strapped states face increasing
pressure to moderate their use of the death penalty or abandon it altogether.
Recent editorials in California, with titles such as “Save $1 Billion in Five
Years—End the Death Penalty,” 137 and “California Can’t Afford the Death
Penalty,” 138 capture the prevailing mood. Similar editorials have appeared
throughout the country lamenting the expense of capital punishment. The
National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty—the leading abolitionist
organization in the country—now lists as its first (of ten) public policy
arguments against the death penalty: “Executions are carried out at a
staggering cost to taxpayers.” 139 The Death Penalty Information Center,
which both reports on, and editorializes about, the American death penalty,
has stepped up its coverage of the financial implications of capital
133
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punishment. The heading of its recently released year-end summary
declared: “Fewest Death Sentences Since Death Penalty Reinstated in 1976;
As Costs Rose in a Time of Economic Crisis, Eleven States Considered
Abolishing the Death Penalty.” 140 This coverage followed the release of the
Center’s earlier special report on the cost issue: “Smart on Crime:
Reconsidering the Death Penalty in a Time of Economic Crisis.”141
The newfound prominence of the cost argument is undoubtedly
traceable to two important recent developments: the escalating costs of
capital punishment in the modern era and the economic downturn over the
past two years. But the seemingly deep resonance of the cost argument in
contemporary debate has other roots as well. The cost argument effectively
shifts the focus of anti-death penalty energy from individual rights and
humanitarian-based arguments that never commanded wide or
overwhelming public support in this country.
Whereas European
opposition to the death penalty draws heavily from claims about human
dignity and concerns about the potential abusive uses of state power (rooted
in the memory of genocide, fascism, communism, and ethnic cleansing),
there has never been widespread anxiety or ambivalence in this country
about entrusting the state with the power to kill or subjecting individuals to
this supreme sanction. The states’ quick and decisive reaction to Furman—
thirty-five states quickly enacted new capital statutes in response to the
Court’s decision—reflects to some degree the absence in this country of a
politically significant coalition organized around deeply held, rights-based
opposition to capital punishment.
Thus, while the cost argument’s appearance may be the product of
changed fiscal realities, it owes its special prominence and power to the
way in which it focuses on uncontroversial, instrumental, collective goals
rather than contentious claims about disputed individual “rights.” The
recent effort in Colorado to tie legislative repeal of the death penalty to
increased funding for the investigation of unsolved murders is a clear
example of the turn from focusing on the condemned to focusing on
alternative collective goods. In terms of practical politics, this change in
focus toward instrumental argument has created a “bigger tent” for those
concerned about capital punishment. To accommodate this broader
constituency (including politicians who have no interest in rejecting the
death penalty as inhumane), advocates for withdrawal of the death penalty
140
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have recast their efforts in terms of “repeal” rather than “abolition.” The
repeal movement—with its focus on pragmatic reassessment of the costs
and benefits of the death penalty—has in many respects supplanted the
narrower and less successful “abolition” movement, which, as the term
connotes, has long been rooted in a moral imperative comparable to the
effort to end slavery.
The cost argument also provides a strong counter to the two most
prominent “pro-death penalty” positions of the current era: retribution and
deterrence. The retributive argument, emphasizing that the death penalty
provides the only appropriate moral response to the “worst” offenses and
offenders, has become perhaps the most significant justification for the
death penalty in recent years as part of the general revival of retributivism
as the leading theory of punishment. Like the anti-death penalty argument
emphasizing human dignity, the pro-death penalty retributive argument
ultimately relies on an abstract moral claim that is not susceptible to
empirical argument or instrumental balancing. Against this lofty moral
claim, proponents of repeal can insist that we simply cannot afford to base
our criminal justice policy on this contested moral claim; the large size of
the overall cost differential between capital and non-capital sentencing
means that we sacrifice too much in terms of other public goods by
retaining the death penalty. As a result, the rhetorical position of
abolitionists and retentionists in previous debates gets flipped: abolitionists
get to shed the unattractive cloak of soft sentimentality and don the mantle
of fiscal responsibility, while retentionists now have to rebut charges that
their attachment to the death penalty is a form of unworldly moralism.
The claim of deterrence by death penalty supporters has long been
contested. In the era preceding Furman, the claim that deterrence of murder
was a justification for retaining capital punishment was generally accepted
to be unproven, perhaps even unprovable. 142 More recently, many
economists and statisticians have revisited the question whether the death
penalty deters, with some studies purporting to find statistically significant
deterrent effects. Although these studies have been subject to withering
criticism from detractors, opponents of the death penalty have found
themselves increasingly on the defensive about the possible value of the
death penalty as a deterrent.143 The cost argument provides a powerful
142
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rejoinder to the deterrence argument, because the unstated premise of the
deterrence claim is that the resources expended on the death penalty are
roughly comparable to those incurred via other sanctions. If capital
punishment were no more expensive than life imprisonment, then it would
seem natural to focus largely on their comparative efficacy as alternative
punishment options. But if abolishing capital punishment would result in
cost savings above and beyond the costs of lifetime incarceration, the
additional money saved could be used for other projects—whether law
enforcement initiatives such as Colorado’s proposed “cold case” funding or
social programs such as funding for early childhood education—that might
offer better crime control than the foregone executions. Thus, even
granting the claim that the death penalty deters homicide better than life
imprisonment, opponents can still argue that the cost savings produced by
abolition would yield maximum benefits to public safety. The cost
argument thus allows abolitionists to put deterrence in its (subsidiary) place
in the larger calculus of crime prevention and to differentiate being “smart
on crime” from being “tough on crime.”
The power of the cost argument stems not only from its ability to focus
political actors and the general public on competing public goods. The
concern about costs also indirectly sheds light on numerous pathologies in
prevailing capital practice, including the inability of states to satisfy
minimum constitutional requirements in capital trials (reflected in high
reversal rates), the absence of political will to carry out executions, the
arbitrariness wrought by the few executions that in fact occur and the
difficulties (both pragmatic and moral) stemming from prolonged deathrow incarceration. Cost is not only a way of avoiding anti-death penalty
arguments that have less traction (such as concerns about arbitrariness and
human dignity); focusing on cost reminds the audience of these problems
even as it concentrates attention on the bottom line. Cost is thus a window
into the current dysfunction of the American capital system, and it provides
a non-ideological, non-controversial shorthand for expressing concern
about a myriad of problems.
B. THE DEATH ROW PHENOMENON: A DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF
MODERN CAPITAL PRACTICE

The modern death penalty debate does not present a choice between
lengthy imprisonment and execution. Rather, the choice is between lengthy

Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 269-89 (2006); Robert Weisberg, The Death
Penalty Meets Social Science: Deterrence and Jury Behavior Under New Scrutiny, 1 ANN.
REV. L. SOC. SCI. 151, 153-163 (2005).
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imprisonment and lengthy imprisonment followed by execution. Or, more
accurately, the choice is between (1) lengthy imprisonment, and (2) lengthy
imprisonment under extreme conditions (usually solitary confinement)
followed by execution, or death in prison while still under a sentence of
death. The unprecedented length of the interval between sentence and
execution, as well as the increasingly harsh conditions of death row, have
generated a new and powerful concern about the American death penalty—
a concern that might well have significant constitutional ramifications.
At the outset, it must be conceded that concerns about the interval
between pronouncement of sentence and execution are not entirely “new.”
Over a century ago, the Supreme Court invalidated the application of a
Colorado law that had altered the post-sentence protocol for consummating
death sentences with executions. 144 The law became operative after the
petitioner had committed his offense and been sentenced to death. Among
the changes in the protocol were substituting imprisonment in the county
jail with solitary confinement in the state penitentiary and giving the
warden discretion to set the date of execution whereas previously it had
been fixed by the court. The Supreme Court found that both of these
changes violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution because they
amounted to “greater punishment.” The Court explained that solitary
confinement had long been viewed as an additional punishment, citing an
English statute passed under King George II that added solitary
confinement to the punishment of death as a “further terror and peculiar
mark of infamy” to deter “the horrid crime of murder [that had] of late been
more frequently perpetrated.” 145 The Court also cited the negative
experiences associated with solitary confinement in this country, describing
how, in prisons housing non-capital inmates, a
considerable number of the prisoners [subjected to solitary confinement] fell, after
even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to
impossible to arouse them, and others become violently insane . . . while those who
stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover
146
sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.

On the second issue, the Court insisted that affording the warden discretion
to determine when the execution would be held (and to keep the date secret
from the prisoner and the public) increased the petitioner’s punishment
because “one of the most horrible feelings to which [the condemned] can be
subjected during [the time confined in the penitentiary awaiting execution]

144
145
146

In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
Id. at 170.
Id. at 168.
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is the uncertainty during the whole of it . . . as to the precise time when his
execution shall take place.”147
What makes the Court’s ruling extraordinary in light of contemporary
practice is not the suggestion that solitary confinement and uncertainty as to
the date of execution constitute additional punishments. It is the fact that
the Colorado law set an outside limit of four weeks before the execution
would be conducted and the warden’s discretion amounted only to deciding
when, after at least two but not more than four weeks of confinement, the
execution would be conducted.
Today, of course, the interval between sentence and execution is often
measured in decades rather than weeks (as in Colorado of the late
nineteenth century) or months and years (as in the practice preceding
Furman). Moreover, the interval continues to increase; inmates executed in
2007 had spent an average of 153 months on death row, compared to an
average of about 140 months in 2000 and 95 months in 1990. 148 In
addition, the conditions of death row confinement have become appreciably
worse over the past several decades. Solitary confinement for as much as
twenty-three hours a day has become the national norm, and most states
prohibit death-sentenced inmates from group recreation or having any
contact visits with family members or friends. Until recently, Texas, which
houses the third largest death row in the country, had permitted deathsentenced inmates with good disciplinary records to participate in a work
program (a garment factory) and group recreation. But the state eliminated
both programs in the wake of an escape incident from death row in 1998; as
a result, death row was moved to a “super-max” facility in which deathsentenced inmates are locked in their cells twenty-three hours a day and are
permitted no physical contact with any other persons.
As the American death penalty stabilized in the two decades following
Furman—in the sense that questions about the constitutionality of the
punishment itself receded from view—concerns about the cruelty and
constitutionality of prolonged death row confinement began to be voiced.
One catalyst for such reflections was the decision of the Privy Council in
the early 1990s declaring that two Jamaican death sentences should be
overturned based on the “inhuman” length of confinement awaiting
execution (at the time of the decision, the appellants had spent about
fourteen years in prison post-trial). 149 American death-row prisoners had
147

Id. at 172.
Time
on
Death
Row,
Death
Penalty
Information
Center,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row#INTRODUCTION (last visited Aug. 18,
2010).
149
Pratt v. Att’y Gen. for Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) 4 (en banc).
148
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challenged their length of confinement prior to the Privy Council
decision, 150 perhaps most famously in the efforts of Caryl Chessman to
avoid execution in the early 1960s,151 but the issue had very little traction in
the state or federal courts. Most courts embraced the view expressed in
Chessman’s case that “[i]t may show a basic weakness in our government
system that a case like this takes so long, but I do not see how we can offer
life (under a death sentence) as a prize for one who can stall the processes
for a given number of years.” 152
The Privy Council decision was important not simply because it found
the lengthy imprisonment intolerable, but because it identified the problem
as a systemic one in the Jamaican system. The Privy Council noted that
numerous other prisoners had spent at least ten years awaiting execution
and that such delays “had never happened in Jamaica before independence”
or in the United Kingdom when it administered the death penalty. 153
Chessman’s lengthy death-row incarceration (twelve years) had been
aberrational. By the early 1990s, though, such incarceration in the U.S.
while awaiting execution was increasingly becoming the norm.
Soon after the Privy Council decision, Justice Stevens announced his
interest in the constitutional question surrounding prolonged death-row
incarceration in Lackey v. Texas,154 a case in which the Court denied
certiorari. He did not dissent from the Court’s refusal to hear the claim of
the inmate (who had spent seventeen years on death row), recognizing that
the “novel” issue should percolate in the state and lower federal courts. 155
He also identified some issues he thought relevant to the claim, such as the
reasons for the delay in a particular inmate’s case (e.g., whether the inmate
had submitted frivolous filings or whether the State’s negligent or
deliberate actions had contributed to the delay).156 But his agnosticism
about the claim was tempered by his suggestions of its merit, citing the
rarity of delays at the time of the Founding, the suggestion in Medley that
prolonged uncertainty about one’s fate generates “horrible feelings,” and

150
See, e.g., Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting a
constitutional claim based on length of death-row incarceration).
151
Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1960).
152
Id. at 607.
153
Pratt, 2 A.C. at 17 (“The death penalty in the United Kingdom has always been
carried out expeditiously after sentence, within a matter of weeks or in the event of an appeal
even to the House of Lords within a matter of months. Delays in terms of years are unheard
of.”).
154
514 U.S. 1045 (1995).
155
Id. at 1047.
156
Id.
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the persuasive power of the Privy Council decision. 157 Justice Breyer also
indicated his agreement “that the issue is an important undecided one.”158
Justice Stevens’s opinion respecting the denial of certiorari prompted
inmates to raise “Lackey” claims with increasing frequency. Together with
the Privy Council decision, Stevens’s opinion also led to more extensive
scholarly attention to both the psychological and legal aspects of the “death
row phenomenon”—the physical and emotional consequences of prolonged
incarceration under a sentence of death. Over the past fifteen years, Justices
Stevens and Breyer have repeatedly called for the Court to address the
issue, with Justice Breyer characterizing the claim as “serious” 159 and
“particularly strong,” 160 and Justice Stevens ultimately declaring that
prolonged death row incarceration is “unacceptably cruel.”161
What should we make of the repeated, unsuccessful efforts to bring the
Lackey claim before the Court, with the most recent efforts162 occurring last
year? The claim clearly has enough staying power to command the
sustained attention of members of the Court, and yet has not been embraced
by any lower courts or been advanced as a major anti-death penalty
argument in public discourse. On the one hand, the problem is getting
worse. Whereas few inmates had been on death row as long as twenty
years at the time Lackey was (not) decided, there are now considerable
numbers of inmates who have been on death row at least two decades.
Indeed, William Lee Thompson, the inmate whose Lackey claim was most
recently before the Court in 2009, arrived on death row in 1976, about two
years before Lackey; the additional fourteen year interval between the
denial in Lackey’s case and the denial in his case meant that Thompson had
spent over thirty-two years on death row (the Lackey claim itself has now
been subject to prolonged limbo). In addition, death-row confinement is
much more severe than in the pre-Lackey era. Justice Stevens made no
mention of death-row conditions in his Lackey opinion, but his Thompson
opinion describes the petitioner’s “23 hours per day in isolation in a 6- by
9-foot cell.” 163
157

Id. at 1045-47.
Id. at 1047.
159
Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
160
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
161
Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1300 (2009) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting
denial of certiorari).
162
Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541 (2009) (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J.,
statement respecting the denial of certiorari); Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1300.
163
129 S. Ct. at 1299.
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On the other hand, the repeated unwillingness of other members of the
Court to hear the Lackey claim reflects some obvious difficulties underlying
the claim. There is the Chessman problem, the reluctance to reward
inmates who manage to keep their appeals (and themselves) alive long
enough to challenge prolonged incarceration. Justice Thomas, who has
repeatedly criticized the Stevens-Breyer effort to bring the claim before the
Court, has been particularly vehement in highlighting this concern, insisting
that he is “unaware of any support in the American constitutional tradition
or in this Court’s precedent for the proposition that a defendant can avail
himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and then
complain when his execution is delayed.” 164 But even if that problem could
be solved (by focusing on delays wholly or mostly attributable to the state,
or by rejecting the notion that seeking enforcement of constitutional
guarantees forfeits the right against excessively prolonged death-row
incarceration), there remains the line-drawing problem.
Does the
Constitution set an outside limit on death-row incarceration (five years?
twenty years?)? If a “rule” could be devised, how would the rule affect the
behavior of lawyers and courts? Would the recognition of a Lackey right to
be free of excessive death-row incarceration lead to summary consideration
of constitutional claims? One of the likely reasons why the “prolonged
incarceration” claim has not been vigorously embraced by abolitionists (the
National Coalition Against the Death Penalty omits this argument in its list
of ten reasons to oppose the death penalty165) is that one obvious response
to the claim is to truncate protections in capital cases. Moreover, specific
concerns about the deprivations of death row (particularly solitary
confinement) are also unlikely to find much resonance in either legal or
popular opinion, given the extent to which concerns about prison conditions
generally fall on deaf ears in both arenas. Although states do not make
solitary confinement a prescribed punishment for given offenses, solitary
confinement has become increasingly common as an instrument of control
in prisons. The general deference afforded to prisons in maintaining order
and discipline (both as a matter of law and public opinion) undermines any
challenge to the conditions of confinement on death row.
The real power of the Lackey claim is not in its potential to yield fruit
as a cognizable claim of individual deprivation. Rather, the issue sheds
light on the dysfunctional character of our capital system. In Lackey itself,
164
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
165
Death Penalty Overview: Ten Reasons Why Capital Punishment is Flawed Public
Policy, NATIONAL COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY 2010),
http://www.ncadp.org/index.cfm?content=5.
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Justice Stevens, echoing Justice White’s opinion in Furman, intimated that
the death penalty might become an unconstitutionally cruel punishment if it
“ceases realistically to further” the purposes of retribution or deterrence.166
Justice White had made this argument in light of the rarity of death
sentences and executions in the era preceding Furman. The increased
death-sentencing in the wake of Furman likely persuaded Justice White that
retention would not, as in the pre-Furman era, lead to “the pointless and
needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any
discernible social or public purposes.” 167 But if executions are endlessly
delayed, and carried out only after inmates have already suffered extensive,
long-term deprivation, it is hard to see what additional retributive or
deterrent value is secured by consummating the delayed executions. In this
respect, the argument about prolonged death row incarceration draws
attention to the inability of states to carry out executions in a sufficiently
timely fashion to claim any public benefit. Concerns about the “death row
phenomenon”—the cruelty visited upon particular inmates—is a window
into the failure of the American death penalty to satisfy the minimal
conditions for its continued use.
It is thus not surprising that Justice Stevens, who had voted to uphold
the death penalty in 1976, 168 and who later declared that the American death
penalty was no longer constitutionally sustainable in 2008, 169 wove his
argument about prolonged incarceration into his broader critique of the
American system of capital punishment. In Baze, Justice Stevens argued
that the retention of the death penalty in the United States was “the product
of habit and inattention rather than an acceptable deliberative process”170
because the penalty no longer served the purposes of incapacitation,
deterrence, or retribution. It failed along these lines, in Justice Stevens’s
view, because the widespread embrace of life-without-possibility-of-parole
sentences had rendered the incapacitation goal unnecessary, the claim of
deterrence had not been established, and the retributive value of the death
penalty was undercut by its sanitized administration in the modern era.171
In Thompson, Justice Stevens’s second-to-last word on Lackey, 172 he
166

Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1046 (1995) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
167
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
168
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-208 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
259-60 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
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Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 78, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Id. at 78.
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Id. at 78-81.
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Justice Stevens’s final opinion respecting the Court’s refusal to entertain a Lackey
claim was issued in Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541 (2009), in which he criticized the
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invoked his dissent in Baze, arguing that “the diminished justification for
carrying out an execution after the lapse of so much time” 173 reinforced his
view that the death penalty cannot withstand review via “an acceptable
deliberative process.” 174
Interestingly, Justice Stevens’s position finds some support from an
otherwise unlikely ally. In the first few years following the reinstatement of
the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia175 and its companion cases,176 Justice
Rehnquist expressed concern about what he then regarded as inordinate
delays in capital litigation. Writing in 1981—fewer than five years postGregg and at a time in which no inmate had spent as much as a decade on
death row—Justice Rehnquist lamented that “hundreds of prisoners
condemned to die [] languish on the various ‘death rows,’ [and] few of
them appear to face any imminent prospect of their sentence being
executed.” 177 Presaging Justice Stevens’s later critique, Justice Rehnquist
went on to say that delays between sentence and execution undermine the
deterrent and retributive value of the death penalty. 178 Justice Rehnquist
made these observations not to lay the building blocks of a constitutional
assault on the death penalty, but to encourage the Court to use its
discretionary jurisdiction to accelerate executions. His opinion—like many
of those lamenting the failure of the Court to review Lackey claims—was
framed as a dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari in a capital case.
The case, Coleman v. Balkcom, 179 has largely been lost to history, even
though it contains one of the more striking suggestions in capital litigation.
Although Justice Rehnquist was unpersuaded that the Georgia courts had
committed federal constitutional error in the petitioner’s case, he argued
that the Court should grant certiorari in the case to expedite consideration of

refusal of the lower federal court to review petitioner’s Lackey claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
173
Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1300 (2009).
174
Id.
175
428 U.S. 153, 206-08 (1976).
176
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276
(1976).
177
Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 958 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
178
Id. at 959 (“When society promises to punish by death certain criminal conduct, and
then the courts fail to do so, the courts not only lessen the deterrent effect of the threat of
capital punishment, they undermine the integrity of the entire criminal justice system.”); id.
at 960 (“There can be little doubt that delay in the enforcement of capital punishment
frustrates the purpose of retribution.”).
179
451 U.S. 949 (1981).
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his claims and to speed his execution. 180 According to Justice Stevens, who
agreed with the Court’s denial of certiorari, Justice Rehnquist was
advancing the proposition “that we should promptly grant certiorari and
decide the merits of every capital case coming from the state courts in order
to expedite the administration of the death penalty.” 181 Justice Stevens
rejected this call, observing that “the Court wisely declines to select this
group of [capital] cases in which to experiment with accelerated
procedures.” 182 Interestingly, Coleman is the first case in which Justice
Stevens confronted the nascent Lackey problem, and he seemed to
acquiesce in the “inevitab[ility] that there must be a significant period of
incarceration on death row during the interval between sentencing and
execution.” 183
Justice Rehnquist’s attempt to accelerate federal review of state death
sentences was on its own terms designed to give states the freedom to reap
the benefits of capital punishment. But lurking in the opinion is
undoubtedly also the concern that continued extensive delays in the
administration of the death penalty might call into question the
desirability—and perhaps constitutionality—of the death penalty itself.
Justice Rehnquist’s lament that the Court’s constitutional regulation of the
death penalty had “made it virtually impossible for States to enforce with
reasonable promptness their constitutionally valid capital punishment
statutes” 184 seems almost quaint given how early his concerns were voiced
in the modern experiment with federal constitutional regulation. And it
certainly is ironic that Justice Stevens, who rejected the call for accelerated
procedures and accepted as inevitable some significant pre-execution
incarceration, would insist almost thirty years later that such prolonged
incarceration, together with other dysfunctional features of states’ death
penalty practice, had rendered the American system of capital punishment
unconstitutional.
Ultimately, then, the significance of the “death row phenomenon”
argument is the way in which it highlights the “American capital
punishment phenomenon”—the prevailing fragility of the death penalty in
this country given the ongoing, pronounced inability of states to
180

Id. at 963 (“If capital punishment is indeed constitutional when imposed for the taking
of the life of another human being, we cannot responsibly discharge our duty by pristinely
denying a petition such as this, realizing full well that our action will simply further protract
the litigation.”).
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Id. at 949 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Id. at 953.
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Id. at 952.
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Id. at 959 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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consummate death sentences with executions. Even high executing states
such as Texas and Florida have inmates who have been on death row since
the late 1970s (as reflected by the fact that Lackey himself was a Texas
inmate and another Lackey dissent-from-denial, in Knight v. Florida, 185
came to the Court from the Florida Supreme Court). The problem is
particularly pronounced in states such as California and Pennsylvania,
where death-sentencing is high and executions are low or non-existent.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Capital Punishment Handbook has a separate
section called “Tenure on Death Row,” 186 replete with citations to relevant
cases and articles.
Neither his comments in Baze nor his statement in Thompson were
joined by any other members of the Court, but Justice Stevens’s attack on
the administration of the death penalty (rather than the death penalty itself)
resonates with recent Court opinions expressing concern about the
American death penalty. Over the past ten years, the Court has imposed
strict proportionality limits on the death penalty, eliminating its availability
for juveniles, 187 persons with mental retardation,188 and for non-homicidal
offenses against persons, such as the rape of a child. 189 Dissenting justices
have also expressed concerns about the lack of safeguards against the
execution of the innocent, 190 the potential disconnect between capital
sentences and community values, 191 and continuing arbitrariness in the
distribution of death sentences and executions. 192 It seems likely that any
future effort to radically limit or constitutionally abolish the death penalty
will be rooted not in a judicial declaration that the death penalty itself is
inhumane or violative of human dignity, but in an opinion similar to the
ones authored by Justice Stevens cataloguing the failure of the American
death penalty to secure the goals the death penalty is said to advance, or to
do so in an acceptable way. Thus, the lingering claim of unacceptably cruel
prolonged death row incarceration remains a potent reminder of the unmet
promises of the American death penalty, and it could ultimately provide a
wedge for reconsideration of the death penalty’s ultimate constitutionality.
185

528 U.S. 990 (1999).
Office of the Circuit Executive, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Ninth
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Outside of the courts, concerns about prolonged death-row
incarceration have contributed to a powerful new policy argument against
the death penalty: the claim that the death penalty disserves the families and
loved ones of murder victims. For many years, the claim that the death
penalty should be retained to ease the pain of the victim’s family went
largely unchallenged and unanswered. Over the past two decades, though,
coinciding with the dramatic expansion of the length of death-row
incarceration, many opponents of the death penalty have highlighted the
pain and frustration for victims’ families caused by extensive post-trial
delays. A recent editorial opposing capital punishment by a former district
attorney in Oregon captures this new form of argument (as well as the cost
argument): “Let me say that my compunctions primarily are not on moral or
ethical grounds involving putting a convicted murderer to death, but on the
way it is used (or not used) in this state, and the enormous expense in
dollars and emotional capital for the families of homicide victims.” 193 In a
recent California case, the father of the murder victim agreed with the
district attorney’s decision to accept a non-death plea in the multiple victim
case because of the likely length of appeals. 194 The father stated that
“[w]hile our unequivocal first choice is the death penalty, we acknowledge
that in California that penalty has become an empty promise,” and the
district attorney indicated that her decision to accept the plea was motivated
in part to spare the victims’ families the years of “suffering” that post-trial
review would entail. In New Jersey, Kathleen Garcia, a member of the
state’s Death Penalty Study Commission who had lost a family member to
murder, based her support of repeal on the harm to victims’ families caused
by delays in the capital system. In an editorial directed to the
reconsideration of the death penalty in New Hampshire, Garcia wrote:
Make no mistake—I am a conservative, a victims’ advocate and a death penalty
supporter. But my real life experience has taught me that as long as the death penalty
is on the books in any form, it will continue to harm survivors. For that reason alone,
195
it must be ended.
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Thus, the argument about the excessive cruelty to prisoners caused by
delays in the system has lent significant support to the claim that our
present system is excessively cruel to the families and loved ones of
victims. The irony, of course, is that the prisoners’ suffering is insufficient
to console the survivors’ unmet expectation of, and hope for, executions,
but the suffering on both sides leads to the same place—great reservations
about the sustainability of the death penalty.
Contemporary death penalty discourse thus increasingly avoids
conflict over the abstract rightness or wrongness of punishing crime with
death. The debate over capital punishment has become a debate about the
American system of capital punishment (with its costs and delays), and this
turn has provided momentum to the repeal/abolition side. The future
stability of the death penalty depends either on a real shift on the ground in
the economics and efficiency of the death penalty or on the ability of
supporters to refocus the American death penalty debate on abstract
retributive arguments, with their longstanding popular appeal in American
culture, emphasizing that some crimes can be appropriately met only with
death.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have paid scant attention to the continuity across generations in
arguments about the morality and wisdom of capital punishment. As any
high school debater could attest, there is a set of relatively stable arguments
that appear and reappear with regularity in different times and places.
However, the foregoing discussion puts to rest the much stronger notion
that death penalty debates are entirely static. Rather, it is clear that there are
discontinuities across eras—discontinuities so dramatic that participants
from an earlier era could not have anticipated, and those from a later era
might not even remember, some of the central claims and arguments made
at a different time. So, as we have reflected on the nature of capital
punishment on the one-hundredth anniversary of this important journal, we
have highlighted ways in which the discontinuity in arguments surrounding
the death penalty has revealed significant discontinuities in the broader
legal and political culture. In our examination of the changing debates, we
have illuminated the different fundamental values that were thought to be
implicated by the abolition or retention of the death penalty at different
times. In addition, we have uncovered the ways in which debates about the
death penalty are not hermetically sealed from other controversial issues of
the day, such as the pressing problem of lynchings in the early twentieth
century, and the deep financial crisis in the early twenty-first century. The
metamorphosis of the values and issues involved, and the terms in which
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they are addressed, shows that there is surprising elasticity in what is
encompassed and at stake in death penalty debates over time.
Moreover, discontinuities in discourse can be understood only in the
full context of how the death penalty was actually administered in the
different eras. The debates reveal enormous changes in the practice of the
death penalty on the ground, including the types of offenses thought to be
death-worthy, the kinds of victims and perpetrators involved, the
procedures for adjudicating guilt and sentence, the modes of execution, and
the nature of death row confinement and prisons more broadly—in short,
the entire criminal justice apparatus surrounding the death penalty. The
debates about the death penalty in different eras thus shed light not only on
the values and issues that are thought to be implicated by the practice of
capital punishment in the abstract, but also on the particularities of the
practice of capital punishment at a given time. In other words, changes in
discourse reveal not only what capital punishment meant or symbolized but
also what capital punishment was or is.
When we look back one hundred years to Ed Johnson’s rudimentary
trial and extrajudicial execution in the face of the Supreme Court’s effort to
exercise jurisdiction over his case, we cannot help being struck by the
foreignness of Ed Johnson’s world. It is easier, however, to forget the
strangeness of the discourse of the past, in part because words fade more
quickly than deeds. By being attentive to the actual debates of the past, we
can recapture the particularity of the everyday world in which the death
penalty operated, and engage what the abolition or retention of the death
penalty meant at different historical moments. Such reflection also allows
us to see how the language and arguments of present death penalty
discourse reveal important aspects of our own world. The foreignness of
the past in both practice and discourse helps reveal the contingency of the
present and suggests new possibilities for the future.
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